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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 
17512 
HOWARD D. NEWMEYER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with two counts of 
Aggravated Sexual Assault, (Rape and Forcible Sodomy) in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-405 (1953, 
as amended) , both first degree felonies. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
on both counts on November 20, 1980, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Maurice Harding, presiding. 
On December 12, 1980 Judge Robert Bullock sentenced appellant 
to an indeterminate term of not less than five (5) years 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T 
which may be for life on both Count I and Count II, with 
the sentences to run concurrently at the Utah State Prison 
{R. 63). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
appellant's conviction and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant and the victim, Marie Martin, althoug' 
not socially acquainted, knew each other because the appellar.: 
frequented Mrs. Martin's place of employment and showed her 
pictures of furniture which he made in his home (T.26,31,134). 
Mrs. Martin became interested in purchasing furniture from 
the appellant and on August 28, 1980, she accepted the 
appellant's invitation to come to his home and seP the 
·1 
furniture when she got off work (T.28). However, ,.vhen Mrs. 
'•_, 
Martin, got off work that night she called the app~J.lant to 
tell him that she did not feel right about going to his home 
and thus could not keep their appointment (T .. ;g, 140). The 
appellant persisted in his request that she sc-e the furniture 
(T.140), and even offered to pick her up at the Purple 
Turtle Drive-in in Pleasant Grove, Utah and take her to his 
home (T.30,141). Appellant met Mrs. Martin at the Purple 
-2-
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Turtle and they went to the appellant's home and looked 
at several pieces of furniture. As they went into each 
room Mrs. Martin would enter first followed by the 
appellant, who would turn on the light (T.63). 
When the tour was complete they went back to 
the living room to discuss prices and terms of a sale 
(T.36,66,150). At this point the appellant told the 
victim that there was another piece of equipment which 
he thought might interest her (T.63). He led her down 
the hall to the bedroom and then moved aside to allow 
her to enter first. The victim entered and when the 
appellant failed to turn on the light, as he had done in 
the previous rooms, she turned to see what was wrong. 
Before she could, the appellant grabbed her from behind 
and took her with him as he fell to his knees (T.36,67). 
Mrs. Martin glanced up and noticed that the appellant 
had a knife in his hand (T.37,68). 
The appellant took the victim's hands and 
secured them behind her back with tape (T.38). He threw 
her on the bed and took off her shoes, socks and pants 
and pulled her blouse over her chest, then he disrobed 
himself and told her to spread her legs and cooperate and 
she would not be hurt (T.40). 
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The appellant attempted to have intercourse 
with the victim. He did not penetrate her vagina but 
his penis touched her vagina (T.41). Becoming frustrated, 
the appellant, at knife point told the victim she was not 
cooperating. He said that she and appellant were going to 
engage in oral sex and any attempt to bit~ his penis 
"would be the end." The appellant then placed his penis 
in the mouth of the victim (T. 42) . When through he again 
attempted vaginal intercourse with the victim, and although 
there was penetration at this point there was not an 
ejaculation (T.42). The appellant then threatened the 
victim by running the knife across her bare chest and 1 
once again engaged in vaginal intercourse (T.43). The 
appellant became frustrated and again performed oral 
sodomy on the victim, ejaculating into her mouth (T.44). 
'r 
The appellant got up from the bed, dres.,.ed and 
\ '. ~ ' 
asked "Now what am I going to do with you?" Mrs. J;1artin 
OJ 
fearing the possibilities responded by saying "God don't 
\' .... 
hurt me" (T. 44). There was a discussion ab9-.. ~ the victim 
going to the police during which the appellar.c told the 
victim that it would be his word against hers if she 
went (T. 45). The victim was still bound and still fearful. 
She told the appellant that she would not go to the police 
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(T.46), and then attempted to change the subject by 
requesting something to drink. The appellant took the 
tape off her wrists and allowed her to dress. 
The appellant took the victim back to her 
car and demanded that she return the paper with his name 
and address on it (T.47). Mrs. Martin returned home and 
found that her husband was angry. She did not know how 
to tell him about the assault (T.48). She washed and 
went to bed but did not sleep (T.49). The next morning 
Mr. Martin left the house without speaking to her so 
again she was unable to tell him what had happened to her 
(T.49). Shortly after her husband left she received a 
phone call from a friend of her husband. The friend 
sensed something was wrong (T.50) and called back later 
in the morning to see if she was alright. When Mrs. 
Martin told him that she needed to talk to someone he 
came to the home accompanied by his wife. The two of 
them listened to Mrs. Martin and then they gave her 
alternatives for dealing with the attack. They also 
contacted Mr. Martin and helped her to break the news 
to him (T.49-52). Mrs. Martin went to the hospital where 
tests were taken at 2:00 p.m., August 29, 1980, approximately 
12 hours after the rape and sodomy occurred. 
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r 
At trial the defendant took the stand and testified in 
his own behalf. During cross-examination by the prosecution 
the court questioned the defendant in order to clarify 
his testimony (T.151). The appellant objected to the 
questioning and his objection was overruled. After the 
jury had retired the appellant moved for ~ mistrial due 
to the judge's questioning of the defendant and this was 
denied. 
The appellant also moved for a mistrial on the 
basis of alleged errors by the prosecutor in his closing 
argument, which was not transcribed. This motion was also 
denied by the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THE TRIAL COURl 
MAY QUESTION WITNESSES; IN THIS CASE TH~ 
COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED THAT RIGHT. 1 · 
.~ . . 
, on appeal appellant alleges that the questo:oning 
of the defendant by the trial court was prejudici~1·and 
should be the basis of reversal of his com,·~ .ions for 
' 1 
rape and forcible sodomy. During the prosecution's 
questioning of the defendant, questions similar to those 
asked by the judge were asked. The defendant did not 
respond to a question, and the judge upon completion of 
-6-
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the questioning of the defendant by both parties, 
questioned to the defendant. Respondent submits that 
these questions were within the trail court's prerogative 
and were not prejudicial or the basis upon which the 
appellant's convictions may be reversed. 
In order to determine whether the questioning 
was in fact prejudicial it is necessary to read the 
questions in context. Prior to the judge's questioning 
the prosecutor conducted the following examination of 
the appellant. 
Q. Did you have a knife on you at the time? 
A. I don't carry a knife. I had no reason to 
carry a knife. 
Where was it? 
Where· was it? 
Where was it? 
The knife was in 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. The closet where 
he found it? 
A. That is true. 
Q. On the shelf? 
A. That is right. 
the closet. 
Detective Blackhurst indicates 
Q. Did you take a look at State's Exhibit No. 3 
when I showed it to your counsel, the one right in 
front of you, the picture? 
A. It's a picture. 
Q. Do you see a closet door there? 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Yes, I see the closet 
Q. It's closed, isn't it? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. It customarily remains 
residence, doesn't it? 
A. Yes. 
door there. 
closed in your 
Q. Did you have any furniture in there that 
you wanted to show Mrs. Martin? 
r 
A. I had no reason to show Miss Martin my close~. 
Q. She never looked in your closet, did she? 
A. She had no reason to. 
Q. You were with her all the time she was in 
the house, weren't you? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. She didn't look in that closet, did she? 
A. No, she didn't. 
T.141-142; and 
Q. You keep your camping gear, as you testified 
to, stored underneath the basement staircase, righ: 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have got butcher knives and chE(e.se 
'•_, 
knives and other knives in the kitchen, ~ight? 
'A. I don't own a butcher knife. 01 
Q. Carving knives? Do you keep them ip ~he 
kitchen? Is that your testimony?-
A. Yes. '1 
Q. Keep them in the drawers? 
A. I keep one in the drawer and keep the other 
one underneath the snack bar on the cheese block, 
-8-
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T.151. 
Q. Marie didn't go underneath the snack 
bar and the cheese block or any drawers to 
look at any of your knives, did she, while 
you were present? 
A. No, she didn't. 
Q. She didn't go in the closet and look at 
a knife? 
A. (No response.) 
As a result of the appellant's lack of response 
to this last question there was an obscurity in the testimony 
of the appellant. It was this obscurity which prompted the 
court to ask: 
Q. Where was it you said you kept this knife? 
A. The one there, Your Honor? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Up in the closet. 
Q. You didn't show it to Marie? 
A. No, not at all. In fact all the knives in 
the house really are not in a visible viewpoint 
at all. They are either in drawers or attached 
to equipment. They were not visible at all. 
Q. Have you ever shown it to her at any time? 
A. No, Your Honor. No. 
Q. How do you account for the fact she told the 
officers the next day what kind of a knife it was? 
A. I cannot account for that. I know the 
officers asked me if I had one like it. I have no 
way of accounting for that, Your Honor. 
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Read in context, it is clear that the questions asked 
by the trial judge lack the prejudicial characterization 
of the appellant's brief. 
Moreover, the test for determining whether the 
trial court acted properly in questioning a witness as 
based on case law and corrunon sense does no~ include 
subjective characterizations of judicial demeanor, tone 
and voice inflictions which cannot be supported by the 
record on appeal. 
In State v. Mellen, 583 P.2d 46 (Utah 1978), 
this Court sustained the appellant's conviction for 
aggravated sexual assault despite questioning by the trial 
court of a witness. In that case the Court noted that 
there is a requirement that a judge maintain an attitude 
of neutrality. This Court also stated: 
} 
Notwithstanding what has just been said,, 
the judge does have a function beyond i._. 
sitting as a comparatively silent monito~ 
1 of the proceedings. In order to discharg~l 
his responsibility of carrying out the 
above stated objective, it is within hisi ·:c· 
prerogative to ask whatever questi.~ .s of 
witnesses as in his judgment is n~- ssary 
or desirable to clarify, explain or·add 
to the evidence as it relates to the 
disputed issues. 
Id. at 48 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 
See also, State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936); 
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State v. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40 P.2d 222 (1935); State 
v. Garret, 595 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1980). Similarly in this 
case the court's questioning was directed at making clear, 
points in evidence. The record does not support appellant's 
claim of prejudice, and the trial court was properly 
exercising its prerogative to question witnesses. 
In Hernandez v. State, 490 P.2d 1245 (Nevada 
1971) , the court affirmed questioning by a trial court 
where: 
. . . the questions asked by the court 
were merely repetitive of those asked 
by counsel; no new avenues were opened 
by this questioning. 
Id. at 1247. 
The present case presents the same type of questioning 
by the court. The court's questions were similar to the 
prosecutor's; they examined subject matter which had been 
reviewed by the State and they opened no "new avenues." 
Recognizing that the permissible scope of questioning 
by a court is narrow, if the trial court was in error in 
asking the defendant questions the error was not prejudicial 
to the appellant's right to a fair trial, and thus it does 
not justify reversal of the appellant's conviction. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1: 
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After hearing an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects 
which do not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties. If error has been committed, 
it shall not be presumed to have resulted in 
prejudice. The court must be satisfied 
that it has that effect before it is warranted 
in reversing the judgment. 
In State v. Kazda, 550 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975), this Court 
stated that error which had a substantial effect upon 
defendant's right to a fair trial would be that: 
. in the absence of the error there is 
a reasonable likelihood that there would 
have been a different result. 
Id. at 950. 
If the court had not questioned the appellant in this case 
the same evidence would have gone to the jury. The alleged 
error occurred after the prosecution had rested and the 
elements of the offense had been established. Furthermore, 
the court mitigated any damage which may have occurred as 
a result of his questioning by issuing jury instruction 
No. 18: Cl 
If during this trial, the Court has:' said 
or done anything which has suggest" i to you 
that it is inclined to favor the ~ - '.ims or 
position of either party, you will 'not permit 
yourselves to be influenced by any such 
suggestion. 
The Court has not intended to indicate 
any opinion as to which witnesses are, or are 
not, worthy of belief, nor which party should 
prevail. If any expression has seemed to 
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(R. 50). 
indicate an opinion relating to any of 
these matters, you should disregard it, 
because you are the exclusive judges 
of the facts. 
In s? stating the court specifically admonished 
the jury that they and not he, were the exclusive judges 
of the facts, and credibility of all witnesses. Thus in 
accordance with § 77-42-1 this Court should not presume 
prejudice. The questioning when read in context does not 
establish a basis for reversal of the appellant's conviction 
since it was merely an attempt to "clarify an obscurity" 
and thus within the trial court's prerogative. 
POINT II 
WHERE ALLEGED ERROR BY THE PROSECUTOR 
IN CLOSIHG ARGUMENT WAS NOT PRESERVED 
IN THE RECORD THERE IS NOTHING TO 
REVIEW ON APPEAL. 
The appellant alleges that the trial court erred 
in refusing to grant his motion for mistrial based on 
alleged errors of the prosecution in its closing argument 
to the jury. The argument was not transcribed. The motion 
which was made after the jury retired was properly denied 
by the trial court. In this case the trial court is the 
only court which was able to analyze what was said and the 
effect, if any of those statements. 
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Appellant correctly cites the test to determi~ 
if remarks made by counsel in arguments require reversal. 
In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973) this Court 
stated: 
Counsel for both sides have considerable 
latitude in their arguments to the jury; 
they have a right to discuss fully from 
their standpoints the evidence 'and the 
inferences and deductions arising therefrom. 
The test of whether the rer..arks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the juror 
matters which they would not be justified 
in considering in determining their verdict, 
and were they, under the circumstances of 
the particular case, probably influenced by 
those remarks. The determination of whether 
the improper remarks have influenced a 
verdict is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court on motion for new trial. 
If there is no abuse of this discretion and 
substantial justice appears to have been 
done, the appellate court will not reverse 
the judgment. 
413 P.2d 422, 426. 
I. 
It is recognized that on appeal "this Co~rt is 
C1 
not inclined to reverse a conviction on matters dehors 
r 
the record." State v. Starlight Club, 406 !'· .-d 912, 913 (V'.-
1965). In State v. Langley, 371 P.2d 586 (Ar'.iz. 1962) thee' 
stated that it "should only review those matters appearing 
" Other states have specificaL in the trial court's records. 
refused to review on appeal issues of prosecutorial errM 
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'cc 
aL 
where the transcript does not contain the arguments and 
objections raised in the trial court. See State v. 
Standley, 586 P.2d 1075 (Mont. 1978); Lewis v. State, 
572 P.2d 211 (Nev. 1977); State v. Halloway, 219 Ka. 245, 
547 P.2d 741 (1976); and Diebold v. People, 485 P.2d 900 
(Colo. 1971). 
Without a record, this Court must rely on the 
wisdom of the trial court which was the only court which 
was able to ascertain whether the alleged error of the 
prosecutor justified a mistrial. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT FOR REASONABLE MINDS TO 
HAVE FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated 
sexual assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405 
(1953, as amended), which provides: 
(i) A person commits aggravated sexual 
assault if: (a) in the course of a rape or 
attempted rape or forcible sodomy or attempted 
forcible sodomy; 
(ii) The actor compels submission to the 
rape or forcible sodomy by threat of kidnapping, 
death or serious bodily injury to be inflicted 
imminently on any person. 
Forcible Sodomy is defined in § 76-5-403: 
(1) A person commits sodomy when.he engages 
in any sexual act involving the genitals of one 
-15-
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person and the mouth or anus of another 
person, regardless of the sex of either 
participant. 
(2) A person commits forcible sodomy 
when he commits sodomy upon another 
without the other's consent. 
., 
In the trial court appellant proceeded on the theory that 
there was no vaginal intercourse, only oral sodomy to whic' 
he claimed the victim consented (T.129). Appellant appeac 
to argue in his brief that the evidence presented at triai 
indicates that the victim consented both to intercourse 
and sodomy. While defendant is entitled to present his 
theory of the case to the jury, he can not advance that 
theory for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the appeL 
may not, on appeal, raise for the first time the issue of 
consent as to the sexual intercourse. State v. Treadway, 
28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972). 
However, if this Court should choose to 'rexamine 
I 
the issue of consent as to the rape charge the appellant's 
.~ 
claim that the evidence established at trial was "i1ih\erent'.. 
incredible" and thus not sufficient for reasonable:· fflihds 
to conclude that appellant was guilty beyor,._ ' reasonable 
'1 
doubt is without merit. The evidence presented below 
when read in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict 
was sufficient to establish that the appellant committed 
forcible rape and forcible sodomy upon the victim, Mrs, Mar: 
-16-
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In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to support 
a jury verdict it is well established that: 
The weight of evidence and the 
credibility of witnesses are reserved 
exclusively for the jury, and this Court 
will not interfere unless the evidence 
is found to be so lacking and insubstantial 
that reasonable men could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Nor will we weigh conflicting 
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, 
or the weight to be given appellant's 
testimony. Further, unless there is a 
clear showing of lack of evidence, the 
jury verdict will be upheld. 
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980), See also 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813-814 (Utah 1977); State 
v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 
1387 (Utah 1977); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); 
and State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977). 
In the case of State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 
(Utah 1977) , this Court stated that where the question of 
guilt or innocence depends upon weighing the credibility 
of the victim against that of the accused: 
Id at 702. 
The rule is that if there is 
nothing so inherently incredible 
about the victim's story that 
reasonable minds would reject it, 
a conviction may rest upon her 
testimony alone. 
In the present case there is nothing so inherently 
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incredible about the victim's story that reasonable 
minds would reject it. Mrs. Martin testified at trial 
that she went to the home of the appellant in order to 
look at furniture which she was interested in purchasing 
(T.28,136). The evidence also establishes that there 
was no prior social contact between the viptim and the 
appellant as they had never dated and had only met in 
a business setting (T.26,31,134). The victim attempted 
to get out of the arranged meeting by calling appellant 
to tell him she could not make it but the appellant 
convinced her to come and look at the furniture (T.29, 
140). Because she didn't know where the appellant's 
residence was located she met him and left her car at 
a local drive-in thus retaining no method of escape (T,29, 
141). 
furniture. 
I 
f 
They went to the appellant's home and hoked at 
! 
There is no discrepancy in the testimo~y of 
Cl 
either witness until the time when they entered the 
bedroom of the appellant. The appellant cla1 1s that the 
victim willingly consented, even suggested thctt they 
· d (T 153) In contrast, the victim's engage in so omy . . 
. 1 
version of the evening, which is supported by circumstantia 
evidence, is that when they entered the bedroom the 
-18-
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' 
appellant grabbed her from behind and then taped her 
mouth and bound her hands (T.37,38). This is substantiated 
by the red marks on her wrists noted by the police officer, 
the nurse, and the doctor (T.101,115,124) and by the 
bruise on her neck which was noted by the nurse (T.115). 
At knife point the victim was told to cooperate and she 
would not be hurt (T.38,40). The appellant then threw 
the victim on the bed and took off her shoes and pants, 
and pulled her shirt and bra over her chest (T.40). He 
attemnted to force himself into the victim, and althouqh 
he did not penetrate there was touchinq of his penis and 
her vagina (T.41). The appellant then told the victim 
that he was going to perform oral sodomy upon her and any 
attempt to bite him ''would be the end" IT. 421. He then 
r11bbed the knife across the chest of the victim, and 
engaged in vaginal intercourse and although there was 
penetration he did not ejaculate at that time (T.43). 
Appellant once again performed oral sodomy on the victim 
and ejaculated in her mouth (T.44), while holding the 
knife to her throat (T.43). 
These events were sufficient to establish that 
the rape and sodomy did in fact occur without the victim's 
consent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (1953, as amended)' 
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provides that an act of sexual intercourse takes place 
without the victim's consent i'n ei'ther of the f 11 · o owing 
circumstances: 
(1) When the actor compels the victim 
to submit or participate by force that 
overcomes such earnest resistance as 
might reasonably be expected under the 
circumstances; or 
(2) The actor compels the victim to 
submit or participate by any threat that 
would prevent resistance by a person of 
ordinary resolution . 
Applvinq this standard in State v. Herzoq, 610 P.2d 1281, 
1283 (Utah 1980), this Court stated: 
The determination of whether 
consent was Present or absent in anv 
criven case is factual in nature. and 
is thus a matter for determination by 
the finder of fact. 
Accord: State v. Meyers, 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980). 
-
In this case the victim acquieced in the sexual arts undN 
't 
threats by the appellant which were accompanied b1 use of 
I .. 
a knife. This was sufficient to prevent the victi~'s 
Cl 
escape or .resistence, and thus the fact that there was no 
attempt to escape is not determinative. App,E ;lant has fail:: 
show that the jury's verdict was based on suc~r unsubstantial 
evidence that reasonable minds could not possibly find 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wilson, 
supra. The jury heard the witnesses and saw the evidence 
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introduced. It was their prerogative to weigh the 
evidence and attach credibility to the witnesses' 
testimony as they saw fit. In this case, it is neither 
inconsistent nor unreasonable for the jury to have 
found the appellant guilty of rape and forcible sodomy, 
and this Court should not set aside the jury's verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court has considerable discretion 
in questioning witnesses in order to clarify testimony 
or elicit the truth and it is only when this discretion 
is clearly abused as demonstrated by an objective reading 
of the transcript, that a conviction may be reversed. 
In this case there was no abuse of this discretion and any 
error that may have occurred was harmless and cured by 
jury instruction No. 18 which admonished the jury not 
to be influenced by statements of the judge. 
The appellant's attempt to allege error as a 
result of the closing argument of the prosecution must 
fail because there is nothing in the record upon which 
this Court may determine if an abuse occurred. In such 
instances the Court should defer to the ruling of the 
trial court in refusing to grant a mistrial since they 
possess an ability to weigh prejudicial effect of the 
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alleged errors. 
Finally, the appellant's contention that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain the appellant's 
convictions is without merit. The evidence viewed in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict establi~u 
that Mrs. Martin submitted to intercourse ,and sodomy 
only after she was bound and threatened by words an~ by 
use of a knife. Therefore the issue of consent is resolved 
under Section 76-5-406, which states that intercourse and 
sodomy is without consent if the actor compels the victim 
to submit to intercourse by threatening her or by over-
coming a reasonable amount of resistence by force. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney GeLeral 
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